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  Testing for “contagion” of the subprime crisis on 
the Middle East and North African stock markets: 
A Markov Switching EGARCH approach 
 
 
Khallouli W.1, Sandretto R.2 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether the recent financial turmoil which arose in the United 
States has contaminated the Middle East and North African countries (MENA). In contrast to 
Lagoard-Segot and Lucey (2009), we try to identify the existence of pure contagion (Masson, 
1999) rather than shift-contagion (Rigobon, 2003). Then, we explicitly define financial 
“contagion” in accordance with Eichengreen et al. (1996) and we extend the Cerra and Saxena 
(2002) methodology by using a Markov-Switching EGARCH model introduced by Henry 
(2009) in order to identify contaminated MENA stock markets. Our results provide evidence 
of a persistence of recession characterised by low mean/high variance regimes which 
coincides with the third phases of the subprime crisis. In addition, there is evidence of mean 
and volatility contagion in MENA stock markets caused by the US stock market.  
 
JEL codes: C32, F31, G01, G15 
 
Keywords: Subprime crisis, Contagion, MENA stock markets, Markov switching EGARCH 
model. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades or so, the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries such 
as many emerging and developing countries have made significant progress toward trade and 
foreign exchange liberalization. To a lesser extent, some of them have moved toward a greater 
integration into the international financial system. Some countries, namely Lebanon, and 
Yemen, are already at an advanced stage of trade liberalization and capital account 
convertibility. Others, such as Egypt, and Jordan have made progress in eliminating import 
and exchange restrictions, lowering import tariffs and adopting current account convertibility. 
In recent years, the liberalization of inward capital movements has been pursued in most of 
these countries, together with a gradual relaxation of controls on outward capital flows. The 
reason for these policies was based on the general expectation that trade and financial 
liberalization would boost the economic activity by reinforcing competitiveness, opening new 
export markets, attracting foreign direct investment and stimulating savings and domestic 
investments. These reforms also paved the way for increased cooperation with developed 
countries, particularly with the European Union and the United States, leading sometimes to 
the conclusion of free trade agreements and even to association agreements. However, MENA 
countries still appear less integrated into international financial markets as compared to other 
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 emerging markets in Asia and South America. Many studies show that the MENA stock 
markets are not connected to developed financial markets (Yu and Hassan, 2006, Lagoarde-
Segot and Lucy, 2007, Cheng et al., 2009). 
 
However, nowadays there is no unanimous view about the consequences of this financial 
integration in emerging and developing countries. Some experts believe that financial 
liberalization produces unquestionably beneficial effects on growth and employment (Collins 
and Abrahamson, 2006), while others underline the fact that a wider integration into the 
international financial markets increases the vulnerability to foreign influences, particularly to 
reversals in international capital movements, which is generally referred to as the risk of 
“contagion”. Therefore, these countries are becoming more and more vulnerable to negative 
foreign shocks (see: Colins and Biekpe, 2003; Bekaert and al., 2005). The subprime crisis, for 
example, was not actually confined to the US mortgage markets. As a result of securitization, 
the crisis spread to the entire financial market, not only in the US, but also to all developed 
countries (Horta et al. 2008). Within a couple of months, the Dow Jones index plummeted 
from 14,093 (September 28, 2007) to 12,980 (November 23, 2007) and then to 6,626 
(March 6, 2009). Similarly, the CAC40 nosedived from 6,168 (June 1, 2007) to 5,442 
(August 15, 2007) and to 2,519 (March 9, 2008). In addition, Dooley and Hutchison (2009) 
and Lahet (2009) find that many emerging markets were affected by the global financial crisis 
after a first phase of resistance until the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. 
 
In any case, due to the current financial crisis, there is growing concern in MENA countries 
regarding the risk of contamination. Although these countries are less financially integrated 
because of capital controls, or due to a poor access to international financing3, they may be 
contaminated by contagion caused by the cognitive convergence of domestic investors during 
the global financial turmoil as suggested by Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2009). Indeed, 
domestic investors in a mid-sized market could become jittery and opt for the minimum cost 
strategy, selling their stocks when they observe high volatility in the US stock market (Alper 
and Yilmaz, 2004). Our objective, in this paper, is to investigate a possible financial 
“contagion” of the financial crisis originated in the US on the emerging markets of the MENA 
region. Given the limited openness of MENA stock markets, rather than focusing on the stock 
market crisis, we try to analyze if the switch to periods of high volatility in MENA equity 
returns could be statistically explained by events in the US equity market during the subprime 
crisis of 2007-2009. More particularly, we examine if “contagion” occurs into countries 
which have poorly liberalized their financial system, as it is the case for some of them in the 
region. 
 
The rationale of this paper is based on the following statement: while an abundant literature 
has been devoted to the current financial crisis, only a few publications try to identify a 
possible transmission to emerging markets (see: Dooley M. and Hutchison M., 2009). Among 
them, the MENA region appears as the poor relation. This region is under-investigated despite 
the significant equity market development in the region since the 1990s (Table 1 in 
appendix 2). The paper of Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2009) can be considered as an 
exception. The authors tried to reduce this gap using the battery of shift-contagion tests based 
on the correlation approach. However, this framework requires a consistently high correlation 
between financial asset markets since it assumes the existence of interdependence according 
to the null hypothesis (Corsetti et al., 2005). In addition, in the MENA context, the 
interdependence with the US stock market seems unsubstantiated. In fact, using cointegration 
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 and causality tests, Neaim (2002), Soofi (2008) and Marashdeh and Shrestha (2010) show the 
absence of interdependence between MENA stock markets and developed stock markets and 
in particular the US stock market. Nevertheless, in this case, the correlation test is not the 
most appropriate for testing contagion. This analysis is too restrictive inasmuch as contagion 
and interdependence are mixed up. Obviously, there is no reason to assume that contagion can 
take place exclusively between strongly and permanently interdependent markets. In this 
paper, we refer to a more general concept in continuation of the approach suggested by 
Eichengreen et al. (1996). We define “contagion” as the increase in the probability of 
occurrence of a crisis in one country following the crisis in another country. Rather than shift-
contagion of Rigobon (2003), our definition coincides with pure contagion of Masson (1999) 
that does not require the existence of interdependence between the origin country (ground 
zero country) and the affected country.  
 
In order to examine the contamination of MENA stock markets, following Chen (2009, 2010) 
and Henry (2009), we focus on the stock market evolution. Using a regime switching 
approach, we identify both bull and bear markets. The first is characterized by a high-mean?, 
low-variance regime and it corresponds to the no-crisis period while the second is 
characterized by a low-mean, high-variance regime and it corresponds to the crisis period. To 
investigate empirically the existence of contagion from the US stock market, we extend the 
Cerra and Saxena (2002) methodology using a time-varying transition probability (TVTP) 
Markov-switching EGARCH model introduced by Henry (2009). Given the fact that the 
correlation approach does not account for volatility as a potential factor of contagion (Baur, 
2003), contrary to Lagoarde-Sego and Lucey (2009), we consider both mean contagion and 
volatility contagion following Baur (2003). The first is realised when changes in the US 
market returns (‘ground zero country’) affect the probability of switching between states 
(from bull market to the bear market) in one MENA stock market. Furthermore, we consider 
volatility contagion when the probability of switching from bull market to bear market in 
MENA stock market depends on the US stock market volatility4. This paper contributes to the 
literature in this field by investigating two important ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, this is 
the first time a Markov Switching approach has been used to identify contagion in MENA 
region during the subprime crisis. In contrast with the correlation approach, our methodology 
directly captures the individual stock market sentiment. However, the correlation approach is 
rather consistent with the structural change of links between markets which can be explained 
not only by shift in investor sentiment but also by endogenous liquidity shocks or political 
coordination (Forbes and Rigobon, 2001). The purpose of our paper is to investigate the effect 
of the subprime crisis on the MENA stock markets sentiment. In this sense, it seems to us that 
our paper complements the study of Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2009), inasmuch as it 
identifies pure contagion rather than shift contagion in the MENA stock markets. That is the 
main originality of our paper, since such an analysis has not been achieved up to this day. 
Secondly, the MS-EGARCH model is used for the first time in order to identify the contagion 
effect during the international financial crisis. Our model tries to capture persistence in the 
conditional variance and asymmetry in stock volatility within each regime (Henry, 2009) 
rather than the simple Markov switching model used by Cerra and Saxena (2002) in the stock 
market context.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents different possible channels of 
transmission which can play a role in the case of emerging and developing countries. 
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 Section 3 describes the method that we use in order to identify “contagion”. Section 4 
presents the data and our findings. Section 5 gives some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Channels of “contagion” 
 
Before the 90’s, the expression “contagion” was completely absent in the economic literature. 
It was only used in medicine, psychology and to a lesser extent in sociology and philosophy, 
with different meanings: transmission by direct or indirect contact; the spread of a behavior 
pattern, attitude, or emotion from person to person or group to group through suggestion, 
propaganda, rumor, or imitation; the tendency to spread, as of a doctrine, influence, or 
emotional state (the free dictionary). 
Following the Asian crisis, it has become one of the most debated topics in international 
finance, with the meaning of correlation of market returns. However, there is no consensus 
about what “contagion” means. Actually, there are at least 5 possible significations of 
“contagion”: 
1. The most general and imprecise one regards “contagion” as the transmission of a 
crisis from one country to another (or from one market to another). 
2. According to a second interpretation “contagion” occurs when the propagation of 
shocks is in excess of fundamentals, that is, when shocks have an different impact, more 
important, or faster than the regular transmission through the usual commercial or 
financial channels and mechanisms between countries or markets. 
3. Another possible description is that “contagion” occurs when shocks spread as a 
result of panic movements and herding behavior of investors. 
4. The fourth approach defines “contagion” as the transmission of shocks through any 
channel that causes markets to co-vary. 
5. A fifth and more precise definition refers to “contagion” as a high frequency process 
of transmission of shocks which occurs with a higher probability during a crisis period 
than during normal or tranquil periods. 
Not surprisingly, with such a variety of definitions, there is a great difference of opinions or 
conclusions about “contagion” frequency, even though these 5 definitions are not completely 
incompatible. 
These different definitions raise several key questions: what are the channels through which 
crises spread across countries and markets? Are these channels specific to crises periods? In 
other words, are these crises contingent or not? Are these channels stable through time or do 
they change specifically during crisis periods? 
With a more all-encompassing view, Forbes and Rigobon (2001) summarize these differences 
with a distinction between two kinds of approaches. 
2.1. Crisis non-contingent channels 
Crisis non-contingent channels of propagation are characterized by the fact that there is no 
difference in the transmission mechanisms between crisis and tranquillity periods. In both 
cases, shocks are propagated along the same causality lines through linkages between 
countries, which can be either structural (and permanent) such as trade links (Gerlach and 
Smets, 1995; Corsetti et al., 1999) and financial links (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder 2003) or temporary, such as common shocks (Masson, 1999); 
fundamentals-based “contagion” (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
More precisely, this fundamentals-based “contagion” can take three channels: 
 Common shocks or monsoonal effect (Masson, 1999) are defined by simultaneous occurrence 
of crises in different countries which have similarities in macroeconomic policies and 
conditions. The contamination is caused by the incapacity of investors to discriminate 
between them after a common shock. According to Forbes and Rigobon (2001), the common 
shocks could be represented by random aggregate shocks (for example a rise in the 
international interest rate) or global shocks (for example a contraction in the international 
supply of capital). 
Trade links are classified in two types of mechanisms: bilateral trade linkages and trade 
competition in third markets. 
- The first one refers to a direct mechanism whereby a financial crisis in one country 
affects negatively other countries with high levels of bilateral trade. On the one hand, a 
financial crisis in the first country reduces import prices in the trading partners (Gerlack 
and Smet, 1995). Devaluation in the first country causes a drop in the export prices 
(denominated in foreign currency) of this country and consequently a reduction of the 
import prices in the trading partners. As a result, the trading partners suffer a negative 
price effect with a reduction of the consumer price index and a fall in demand for 
money and credit. Consequently, residents in these countries are prompted to convert 
domestic money into foreign currency, which causes the depletion of official reserves 
and may trigger a currency crisis (see: Reside Jr and Gochoco-Bautista, 1999). On the 
other hand, a financial crisis in the first country may turn into an economic crisis in this 
country. Consequently, the imports tend to decrease. This negative income effect 
spreads in the trading partners by reducing their exports and thus causing a trade deficit 
which sets up the domestic currency for a speculative attack (Hail and Pozo, 2008; Van 
Rijcheghem and Weder, 2001). 
- The second type of mechanism suggests that financial crisis propagation can result 
from a loss of international competitiveness. In this case, depreciation or devaluation of 
the domestic money in the first country reinforces its competitiveness in the presence of 
nominal rigidities (Glick and Rose, 1999). This evolution negatively affects its main 
trading partners (with an important bilateral trade) or its main competitors that export to 
the same third markets. Consequently, the exports of these partners or competitors will 
decrease, creating a trade deficit which may contribute to the triggering of a crisis. 
Financial links seem also to be an increasingly more important channel of “contagion” since 
emerging markets are increasingly integrated into global markets. Hence, with the global 
diversification of financial portfolios, the behavior of international investors are driven by two 
main factors. When a financial crisis occurs in one country, liquidity problems and 
information asymmetries can cause cross-border spillovers. These two factors also influence 
the behavior of international commercial banks which lend to several countries. 
- If stock prices are tumbling down in one country, international investors may decide to 
sell off assets in other countries in order to rebalance their portfolios (Calvo, 1999). 
Valdes (1997) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) describe a similar mechanism at 
work when investors, upon receiving margin calls based on the decline in prices of 
some assets, decide to sell assets in other countries. Calvo (1999) underlines the fact 
that asymmetric information tends to amplify this portfolio rebalancing process. 
Logically, risk management techniques impose on investors the need to reduce their 
exposition in the most volatile and risky assets classes as well as credit lines in 
correlated markets. As a result, foreign banks will sell off loans and investments in 
other countries than the “ground zero” country, thereby spreading the crisis. 
 - Obviously, a loss of liquidity is also an important spillover mechanism behind 
propagation, explaining why a crisis in a “ground zero” country (the first country to 
experience a crisis) tends to spread to other countries. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) 
and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) also show that the behaviour of international 
commercial banks could cause cross-border spillovers. In case of a crisis in one country, 
the percentage of non-performing loans for foreign creditor banks will rise since the 
probability of repayment decreases. This leads to liquidity problems. Foreign banks then 
need to recapitalize and increase provisions for bad loans. Thus, they may withdraw 
their investments from other countries. 
 
2.2. Crisis contingent channels of propagation 
 In this second approach, investors behave differently after a crisis in another country, 
implying as such the generation of new temporary channels of propagation and adding or 
substituting the permanent channels which are based on the various interdependences between 
the economies. It is sometimes described as “shift-contagion” and it can include three 
mechanisms: Endogenous liquidity shocks, political perception transmission and pure 
“contagion”. The latter is generally the consequence of changes in investors’ attitudes caused 
by financial panic and/or by the sudden perception of risks, leading to herding behaviors or 
switches of expectations (Masson 1999). Flavin et al (2008) distinguish between shift-
contagion and pure contagion. By contrast to shift-contagion, pure contagion is only active 
during periods of external stress and does not require the existence of normal levels of market 
interdependence. Therefore, for MENA countries, given their limited financial integration 
with developed countries, pure contagion due to switches of expectations of domestic 
investors seems more plausible than shift contagion.     
 
For MENA countries, these two kinds of channels (non-crisis contingent channels vs. crisis 
contingent channels) can play a role, even though the first one seems more plausible, in as 
much as their financial markets are relatively small with a low volume of transaction and few 
listed companies, compared to developed markets (see table 2 in appendix 2). In this paper, 
we refer to Eichengreen et al. (1996), who consider “contagion” as the increase in the 
probability of crisis’ occurrence in one country after the occurrence of a crisis in another 
country (“ground zero country”). This definition allows us to identify pure contagion as one 
of the crisis contingent channels (Forbes and Rigobon, 2001) from the US to MENA countries 
during the subprime financial crisis 2007-20095. We focus our analysis on the stock market 
evolution. Therefore, identifying pure contagion is useful for both economic authority and 
international investors. Actually, bringing herding behaviours of domestic investors under 
control is a key aspect of MENA authorities (as well as in any other countries) in order to 
contain the financial crisis. In addition, given the sharp fall of equity markets in developed 
countries during the subprime crisis, testing for pure contagion can provide more information 
on the segmented MENA equity markets to investors, bankers and portfolio managers. 
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 3. Identifying “contagion” methodology 
 
How we can identify “contagion”6? Several different procedures, methodologies and 
techniques have been developed during the last 12 years. Most of them use the Probit/Logit 
methodology (Eichengreen et al. 1996; Glick and Rose, 1999; Caramazza et al. 2004). 
However, Cerra and Saxena (2002) used the Markov Switching approach to model the 
nonlinear behaviour of the crisis index without a need to transform it into a binary variable as 
it is the case in the qualitative models (probit or logit models)7. According to Abiad (2003), 
this transformation is based on the choice of a crisis index threshold which differentiates the 
tranquillity and crisis periods. Of course, such a preliminary choice is obviously arbitrary. 
Besides, it generates a loss of information with the possibility of uncaptured crises periods 
(Mariano et al. 2004). Following the above cited literature we apply the Markov Switching 
Regime Model (MSRM) to avoid these drawbacks. 
By contrast to the currency crisis, in stock market context, the MSRM is not frequently used 
to identify contagion. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, Cerra and Saxena (2002) are the 
only exceptions. In this study, we extend the Cerra and Saxena methodology using the MS-
EGARCH (1,1) model introduced by Henry (2009). He modifies the EGARCH specification8 
to account for such structural changes in the mean and variance terms using unobserved states 
St . According to Chen (2009), St = 0 indicates the low-mean, high-variance regime 
(bear market) and St =1 the high-mean, low-variance state (bull market). The St process is 
assumed to follow a Markov chain of order one. Its transition probability matrix P is given 
by: 
 
(1) 
where  represents the probability 9 that state  at time , will be followed by state  at 
time : 
 (2) 
Therefore, the following equalities hold: 
 
(3) 
 
The MS-EGARCH model used in this paper is given by: 
 
 
~  
 (4) 
 (5) 
  
                                                
6 In order to clarify the terminology, we think that it would be better to use the word “contagion”  ” for pure form 
of “contagion” (as described originally by Masson, 1999), or for crisis-contingent mechanisms of contamination, 
or for crises based on herding behaviors of investors.  
7 Which are also used in the crisis EWS literature (e.g. Kamin et al. 2001). 
8 The linear EGARCH model was introduced by Nelson (1991) and proposed a positive conditional variance 
without need for non-negativity constraints as it is the case in the estimation of GARCH models.  
9 The transition probabilities, which are assumed to be constant over time,  are specified by the logistic 
functional form (cf. Henry, 2009) 
  
 
 (6) 
 
 
 
where ‘ ’ represents the return on one stock market index between time and ,  is the 
error term for the return at time ,  is the lag operator and  is the intercept term. 
Eq.(4) refers to the conditional mean in which intercept is allowed to switch between a high 
mean returns  and a low mean returns . In addition, Eq.(6) allows us to model the 
conditional variance of  for a high volatility regime  and the low volatility regime . It 
ensures the positive conditional variance and account for the leverage effect10. That is 
coefficients  and  that allow capturing asymmetric respond of conditional variance to 
shock  of either sign for two regimes high/low volatility, respectively.   
According to Cai (1994) and Hamilton and Susmel (1994), the autoregressive term  in 
Eq.(6) leads to a path-dependent structure difficulty. In this case, maximum likelihood 
estimation of the model is computationally intractable because the conditional variance  
depends on the entire past history of unobserved regimes. Following Gray (1996) and Henry 
(2009), we adopt an approximation measure of  in Eq.(6) to avoid the path dependent 
problem. Using the information observable at time , the conditional expectation of the 
past variance is given by: 
 
 
(7) 
 
Using (7) in place of  in Eq.(6), implies that each conditional variance is depending only 
on the most recent regime and not on the entire history of the process (Henry 2009).  
The chief objective of this study is to identify the “contagion” effect of the US subprime crisis 
to the MENA stock markets. To this end, we first test the superiority of the Markov switching 
model with transition probabilities varying over time. Then, we go further by adopting time-
varying transition probabilities (TVTP) depending on  in the benchmarking MS-EGARCH 
model. In order to detect the US subprime crisis, we consider first the negative shocks of the 
US stock markets return when  decreases. In this case, using the TVTP allows us to test 
whether a fall in the US stock market return (  ) influences the probabilities of a change 
from the bull market to the bear market in the MENA countries. Such an impact would clearly 
identify a contagion process. Following Baur (2003), this type of contagion is qualified by 
‘mean contagion’. In addition, according to Baur (2003), crises periods could be identified by 
an increase in volatility which characterises a greater uncertainty. When this volatility has a 
significant effect on the conditional volatility of other stock markets, then there is evidence of 
a volatility spillover (Edwards, 1998). However, Baur (2003) distinguishes between volatility 
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 spillover and volatility contagion. He supposes that the effect of a volatility increase in one 
market on the conditional volatility of another stock market takes place only during crises 
periods. In contrast, volatility spillover can occur at any time. Then, the TVTP allows us to 
conceptualize the notion of volatility contagion as a significant effect of the volatility increase 
in the US stock market on the switching regime of conditional volatility of MENA stock 
markets. Testing both mean contagion and volatility contagion allow us to identify all types of 
negative effects of the US subprime crisis on the MENA stocks markets since mean contagion 
is not necessarily associated with the volatility contagion (Baur, 2003).  
 
Thus, following Diebold et al. (1994), the transition probabilities may be written: 
=  
         
(8) 
=  
(9) 
where ( ) represents the probability of switching from the high-mean, low-variance 
(low-mean high-variance) state to the low-mean high-variance (high-mean low-variance) state 
in the next period. The equalities given by equations (3) always hold. Note that following 
Filardo (1994), we we lagged  to ensure they are strictly exogenous and must be 
conditionally uncorrelated to the unobserved state. However, to evaluate the statistical 
signification of  on the switching of the MENA stock returns between states, we test the 
null hypothesis of  using the likelihood ratio statistic suggested by Filardo (1994) : 
~  
where  and  denote the log likelihood under the null hypothesis and under the 
unrestricted model, respectively. Under the null hypothesis, the LR statistic has the standard 
asymptotic  distribution with two degrees of freedom. If the null hypothesis is rejected, 
we analyze then the marginal effect of  on the switching from the high-mean low-variance 
regime (bull market) to the low-mean high-variance (bear market) of the MENA stock 
markets. According to Filardo (1994), the marginal effect of  on  for is given by: 
 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
Since the transition probabilities and  are non-negative and range between zero and 
one in magnitude, then the marginal effect  ( ) has the same sign as .  
Therefore a decrease of the probability of remaining in the high-mean low-variance state is 
caused by an increase of the US stock market volatility and/or decrease of the US stock 
market returns. In both cases we may expect to get < 0 and/or > 0, respectively. 
 Since  then the probability of switching from bull to bear market increases when 
the probability of remaining in the high-mean low-variance state  decreases. We interpret 
this result as the indicator of volatility and/or mean contagion effect from the subprime crises 
to the MENA stock markets. 
Like Hamilton (1989) and Diebold et al (1994), we estimate our Markov switching EGARCH 
model with the fixed transition probabilities or with the time-varying transition probabilities 
by implementing the EM (Expectation - Maximisation) algorithm11, programmed in Gauss 7.0 
to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of all the parameters. 
 
4. Data and empirical results 
4.1. Data description and GARCH approach 
To identify the MENA ‘bear market phases’ during the global financial crisis, daily closing 
stock market index prices from nine countries are examined in this study. We consider the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries namely Oman (OMA), Bahrain (BAH), Kuwait 
(KUW) and Dubai (DUB) and non GCC countries, such as Morocco (MOR), Egypt (EGY), 
Turkey (TUR) and Jordan (JOR). In addition, to investigate the “pure contagion” from the US 
stock market, we base our analysis on the SP&500 of the US stock market index price as 
“ground zero” country. All indices are denominated in US dollars. This allows us to capture 
the point of view of the international investors. The stock market assets returns are calculated 
as follows: , where  is the stock price on the date t. The data are 
sampled over the period from February 20th, 2007 to March 31th, 2009, for a total of 551 
observations. All data are extracted from the Datastream database. We use daily return series 
because high frequency data contains enough numbers of observations over a crisis period 
(Cerra and Saxena, 2002). In addition, the sample period contains only the subprime crisis 
windows starting with the first phase in February 2007 (Dooley and Hutchison, 2009). 
 
Table 1 provides the cross-market correlations with the US stock market and some 
descriptive statistics for all of the countries analyzed. 
 
Table 1. Correlations with the US stock market and descriptive statistics 
 
 
Correlation Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis J-B LB2(12) 
OMA 
0.0337 
-0.0383 0.0053 8.0395 -8.6973 1.8131 -0.8129 9.5480 1045.07* 453.36* 
BAH 
0.0168 
-0.0538 -0.0084 2.6723 -3.7163 0.7113 -0.9245 7.2947 501.95* 197.11* 
KUW 
-0.0007 
-0.0934 0.0060 4.8062 -8.3003 1.3561 -0.7406 7.8075 580.99* 246.47* 
DUB 
0.1025 
-0.1805 -0.0116 10.218 -8.8196 2.1750 0.1120 8.0239 580.63* 451.39* 
MOR 
0.0756 
-0.0118 0.0121 6.1258 -6.4807 1.3631 -0.3616 7.0020 379.71* 154.53* 
EGY 
0.1752 
-0.0813 0.0889 5.7576 -17.494 1.9085 -2.0715 17.281 5076.86* 76.075* 
TUR 
0.4169 
-0.1328 -0.0346 15.852 -14.761 3.1860 -0.1575 6.1877 235.57* 119.21* 
JOR 
0.007 
-0.0223 0.0000 4.7014 -4.7229 1.4110 -0.2757 4.3417 48.31* 522.43* 
Note: J-B is the statistic of Bera and Jarque (1980) normality test. * denote statistical significance at 1%. 
          LB2(12) is the Ljung-Box test for squared returns with 12 lags. * denote statistical significance at 1%. 
 
 
                                                
11 This algorithm is proposed by Dempster et al. (1977). Dielbold et al. (1994) provide more description for the 
EM algorithm. 
 As shown in the first column in table 1, most of the correlation coefficients between 
the SP500 stock market index return and MENA cross-market seem excessively low. The 
higher correlation is with Turkey (0.416). As expected, this result confirms that there is not a 
clear interdependence between the US and the MENA stock markets of our sample. In 
addition, table 1 shows that Turkish and Dubai stock markets have the highest volatility. For 
these countries, the standard deviation is respectively equal to 3.186 and 2.175. Both are also 
associated with a negative average return. Skewness and Kurtosis coefficients of the different 
series indicate a deviation from the normality assumption. Results of the J-B test show that 
the null hypothesis of normal distribution is significantly rejected for all stock markets 
returns. Finally, in order to test the stationarity of our series returns, we apply the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Perron-tests (PP). The results indicate that the null hypothesis of a 
unit root is always rejected for all series. Hence, all MENA and US returns are I (0) and 
stationary12. 
 
      Since we use the daily frequency, our data could be affected by volatility changes over 
time and volatility clustering (Brunetti et al., 2008). Figure 2 of squared returns could show it. 
The Ljung-Box (1978) statistic reported in the last column of Table 1, shows that the null 
hypothesis of uncorrelated squared returns for all countries, is rejected. This result confirms 
evidence of volatility clustering (Caporale et al., 2006) and consequently the presence of 
conditional heteroscedasticity effect (Bollerslev, 1986). More formally, P-values results of the 
LM and the LB2 of linear AR(1) model in table 2, confirm the strong evidence of ARCH 
effect in the standardized residuals. All these findings motivate the use of the GARCH 
approach for capturing the volatility clustering phenomenon. Following Henry (2009), we 
estimate for each of our MENA stock markets returns a simple AR(1)-EGARCH (1,1) model. 
This last one also allows the capture of the asymmetry in volatility generated by the leverage 
effect when a large price increase or a sharp price drop affects differently the volatility 
(Khedhiri and Muhammad, 2008). The results reported in table 2, show that both the LM and 
the LB2 tests succeeded in rejecting the ARCH effect for all series except for Jordan that 
presents a significant autocorrelation for the squared residuals. On the other hand, our 
EGARCH model captures the asymmetry in the volatility given the negative and significant 
 for the majority of countries. All these findings motivate the use of the EGARCH approach 
for modelling the Markov switching model.    
 
 
4.3. Global Financial crisis diagnostics for MENA countries: MS-EGARCH model with 
Fixed Transition probabilities  
 
 
We use the likelihood ratio (LR) tests in order to test the null hypothesis which is the linearity 
of our EGARCH model. The alternative hypothesis is the Markov-switching EARCH model.  
although the GARCH approach is able to capture the clustering volatility and/or asymmetry in 
volatility, it fails to capture structural shifts in the data caused by international financial crises 
(Edwards and Susmel, 2001). The LR test allows us thus to identify the structural break or 
switch between the two regimes (stability and crisis) during the subprime turmoil period 
(2007-2009). However, as noted by Davies (1977), there are nuisance parameters under the 
null hypothesis since the transition probabilities are unidentified (Henry, 2009). Then, the LR 
statistic  has a non-standard asymptotic distribution. Therefore, 
                                                
12 The results are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request. 
 it seems more judicious to adopt the Davies (1977) upper bound approach as suggested by 
Garcia and Perron (1996). Assuming that the likelihood ratio has a single peak, the P-values 
of the upper bound on the (5)13 statistic14, are then calculated. The results, reported in 
table 3, support the rejection of the null hypothesis (the linearity of the model) at a significant 
level of 5% for all series with the exception of Jordan stock markets. Our result for Jordan is 
more difficult to explain. However, the lower liquidity levels and higher sectoral 
concentration of the Jordan stock market compared to the non GCC countries of our sample 
(Lagoarde-Segot and Lucy, 2009) could be a part of the explanation for the Jordanian stock 
market immunity.  
Therefore, we can conclude that the MS-EGARCH has identified the regime shifts in the 
majority of the MENA stock markets. To be more precise, with the exception of Jordan, our 
results provide evidence that the MENA stock markets have been affected by the global 
financial crisis and obviously switched from the ‘bull market’ with a higher return and lower 
variance to ‘bear market’ characterised by low-return volatile. As shown in table 3, we notice 
that for all countries affected by the global financial crisis, average returns for the regime 0, 
are substantially lower than those of regime 1. In contrast, it is clear that unconditional 
variances for regime 0, are substantially higher than those of the regime 1. In fact, daily return 
for stable regime  ranges from 3.3% to 22.1% while daily return depreciation during crisis 
regime jumps to 120.1 % for the Dubai stock market. In addition, in regime 1, the value of the 
conditional variance intercept’  is between -1.244 and 0.779, whereas, in crisis regime,  
is around 0.301 to 1.655 in the Turkey stock market, implying a relatively high level of 
unconditional volatility for all affected countries. Additionally, in this regime, with the 
exception of Kuwait, our results find evidence of an asymmetric effect of negative news on 
conditional volatility. Indeed, for all these affected countries, the values of  are negative 
and are significantly different to zero, implying that negative innovations to returns have a 
bigger impact on volatility than positive innovations of equal size. Moreover,  is 
significantly different from zero for all affected stock markets with the exception of Morocco. 
This result shows the persistence in conditional volatility caused by the persistence of shocks 
arriving in crisis regimes.  
 
Table 3 also reports the unconditional probabilities of two regimes. The unconditional 
probability P11 of being in regime 1, characterized by a higher return and a lower volatility, 
ranges between 96.5% for Bahrain and 98.3% for Morocco. This means that there is a lot of 
persistence in the no-crisis state for MENA stock markets during the subprime crisis. On the 
other hand, the unconditional probability P00 of staying in a crisis regime with low-return 
volatility seems smaller than the probability of remaining in regime1. However, P00 ranges 
between 86.7% for the Bahrain stock market and 96.6% for the Morocco stock market. The 
expected duration of crisis regime is between 8.06 days for the Bahrain stock market and 
29.41 days for Morocco. The second higher persistence of staying in crisis regime is about 20 
days for the Turkey stock market. According to Ismail and Isa (2008), the small persistence of 
regime 0 compared to the persistence of regime 1, implies that only extreme events can switch 
the MENA stock markets from a stability characterized by a bull market to a crisis situation 
characterized by a bear market.  
                                                
13 In our case, the number of degrees of freedom is equal to 5 which is equivalent to the additional parameters 
appearing in the Markov-switching EGARCH model to the EGARCH model.  
14 We assume that the likelihood ratio has a single peak. P-value is given as Pr(χ2 >LR)+2(LR/2)D/2 exp(-LR/2) 
/Γ(D/2) where D=5 parameters and Γ(.) is the gamma function. 
  
Figure 2 in appendix 1 exhibits the smoothed probabilities15 of being in the crisis regime (bear 
market) using MS- EGARCH estimations. It is clear that our model identifies the three phases 
of the subprime financial crisis. For most affected countries, the peaks of smoothed 
probabilities for bear market regime are synchronized with these three phases. A first phase is 
characterized by the shorter shocks identified by the shorter bear markets for all MENA 
countries. Only the Turkey stock market has reacted clearly to the burst of US mortgage 
bubble in august 2007. The Turkish smoothed probability can identify a long bear market 
from 19 July 2007 to 22 August 2007. However, the smoothed probabilities of Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Dubai and Egypt stock markets show a short bear market between one- and three-day 
bear markets in August 2007. This first phase finishes by shorter bear markets in all stock 
markets with the exception of Morocco. According to Dooley and Hutchison (2009), these 
shocks could be explained by the fall in oil prices for GCC countries and the fall of 
commodity prices for Egypt and Turkey. Smoothed probabilities can also identify the shorter 
phase 2 from May 2008 to the beginning of August 2008. This second phase is clearly 
apparent by a persistent bull market (no-crisis regime) for all countries16. However, a long 
bear market has appeared since September 2008 that seems to coincide with the third phase of 
financial instability on a worldwide level. Moreover, bear market from September and 
October 2008 (Lehman bankruptcy), is clearly apparent for all affected MENA stock markets. 
Since this date, we can show that bear market persists during the third phase for all countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 Contrary to the filtered probability that is estimated using information available at time point t, the smoothed 
probability is estimated using full sample information to determine switch occurrences between the unobserved 
regimes. Following Hamilton (1989), smoothed probability allows to capture the turning points when it is 
greater than 50%. 
16 When smoothed probability of regime 0 (bear market) is closed to zero, the smoothed probability of regime 1 
(bull market) is close to one since P00 = 1-P11. 
 Table 2: Estimation results of AR(1)-EGARCH (1,1) 
 Oman Bahrain Kuwait Dubai Morocco Egypt Turkey Jordan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LogLik 
 
 
LM  Test
a 
 
 
LB(12)
b 
 
 
LB
2
(12)
b 
 
 
 
-0.042 
(0.043) 
0.102 
(0.023***) 
0.344 
(0.059***) 
0.894 
(1.942) 
-0.139 
(0.04***) 
 
 
- 927.84 
 
 
 (0.999) 
[ 0.000] 
 
 (0.983) 
[0.232 ] 
 
 (0.999) 
[0.000] 
 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
-0.119 
(0.048***) 
0.247 
(0.057***) 
0.850 
(2.185) 
-0.147 
(0.053***) 
 
 
- 526.24 
 
 
(0.768) 
[ 0.000] 
 
 (0.002) 
[0.021 ] 
 
 (0.392) 
[0.000] 
 
 
 
-0.0003 
(0.039) 
0.017 
(0.01*) 
0.210 
(0.054***) 
0.943 
(5.578) 
-0.147 
(0.029***) 
 
 
- 819.89 
 
 
(0.561) 
[ 0.000] 
 
 (0.703) 
[0.495 ] 
 
 (0.393) 
[0.000] 
 
 
 
-0.126 
(0.033***) 
0.170 
(0.007***) 
0.349 
(0.007***) 
0.871 
(0.05***) 
-0.121 
(0.184) 
 
 
- 1091.73 
 
 
(0.202) 
[ 0.000] 
 
 (0.009) 
[0.159 ] 
 
 (0.634) 
[0.000] 
 
 
 
0.032 
(0.041) 
0.032 
(0.014***) 
0.316 
(0.051***) 
0.931 
(4.687) 
-0.069 
(0.032***) 
 
 
- 856.63 
 
 
(0.198) 
[ 0.000] 
 
 (0.519) 
[0.003 ] 
 
 (0.540) 
[0.000] 
 
 
0.044 
(0.05) 
0.027 
(0.011***) 
0.096 
(0.021***) 
0.962 
(5.288) 
-0.177 
(0.022***) 
 
 
- 1017.03 
 
 
(0.769) 
[ 0.043] 
 
 (0.850) 
[0.217 ] 
 
 (0.991) 
[0.000] 
 
 
-0.0007 
(0.001) 
0.375 
(0.015***) 
0.282 
(0.048***) 
0.821 
(0.035***) 
-0.209 
(0.026***) 
 
 
- 1369.45 
 
 
(0.226) 
[ 0.1] 
 
 (0.348) 
[0.147 ] 
 
 (0.812) 
[0.000] 
 
 
0.020 
(0.003***) 
0.032 
(0.011***) 
0.309 
(0.042***) 
0.945 
(0.034***) 
-0.038 
(0.025) 
 
 
- 858.17 
 
 
(0.942) 
[ 0.000] 
 
 (0.307) 
[0.298 ] 
 
 (0.04) 
[0.000] 
 
 Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
            a. Lagrange multiplier ARCH test on standardized residual. The P-Values are displayed as (.).The P-Values for the linear AR(1) model are displayed as [.]. 
                  b. Ljung-Box (1978) tests for standardized residuals and squared standardized residuals with 12 lags. The P-Values are displayed as (.). The P-Values for the linear AR(1) model are displayed as [.]. 
  
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Estimation results of the MS-EGARCH(1,1) with the TFP 
 Oman Bahrain Kuwait Dubai Morocco Egypt Turkey Jordan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LogLik 
LR 
 
 
 
 
-0.546 
(0.104***) 
0.123 
(0.038***) 
1.299 
(0.073***) 
-0.722 
(0.046***) 
-1.481 
(0.060***) 
-0.224 
(0.041***) 
0.317 
(0.021***) 
0.185 
(0.026***) 
-0.198 
(0.021***) 
-0.882 
(0.022***) 
0.918 
(0.041***) 
0.975 
(0.239***) 
 
-863.5 
128.68*** 
[0.000] 
 
12.19 
 
 
-0.345 
(0.117***) 
0.033 
(0.021*) 
0.301 
(0.07***) 
-1.244 
(0.08***) 
-0.684 
(0.06***) 
0.155 
(0.042***) 
0.329 
(0.049***) 
0.21 
(0.051***) 
-0.197 
(0.033***) 
-0.830 
(0.075***) 
0.876 
(0.042***) 
0.965 
(0.341**) 
 
-493.27 
65.94 
[0.000] 
 
8.06 
 
 
-0.494 
(0.172**) 
0.086 
(0.038**) 
1.014 
(0.075***) 
-0.536 
(0.065***) 
-0.959 
(0.063**) 
0.351 
(0.055***) 
0.428 
(0.032***) 
-0.13 
(0.044**) 
-0.196 
(0.031***) 
0.011 
(0.138) 
0.941 
(0.446**) 
0.975 
(0.441**) 
 
-797.72 
44.34 
[0.000] 
 
16.94 
 
 
-1.201  
(0.277***) 
0.052 
(0.055) 
1.4 
(0.082***) 
-0.463 
(0.123***) 
-1.569 
(0.067***) 
-0.695 
(0.099***) 
0.317 
(0.023***) 
0.308 
(0.125**) 
-0.206 
(0.017***) 
-0.7 
(0.123***) 
0.877 
(0.271***) 
0.969 
(0.269***) 
 
-1052.77 
77.92 
[0.000] 
 
8.13 
 
 
-0.197 
(0.177) 
0.077 
(0.042*) 
0.947 
(0.076***) 
-0.006 
(0.185) 
-0.79 
(0.065***) 
0.468 
(0.155***) 
0.452 
(0.048***) 
0.088 
(0.132) 
-0.175 
(0.039***) 
-0.076 
(0.039*) 
0.966 
(0.557*) 
0.983 
(0.443**) 
 
-846.59 
20.08 
[0.0209] 
 
29.41 
 
 
-0.813 
(0.174***) 
0.186 
(0.051***) 
1.279 
(0.072***) 
-0.018 
(0.063) 
-1.161 
(0.058***) 
-0.064 
(0.051) 
0.464 
(0.028***) 
-0.133 
(0.041***) 
-0.184 
(0.026***) 
-0.118 
(0.028***) 
0.912 
(0.128***) 
0.97 
(0.159***) 
 
-985.46 
63.14 
[0.000] 
 
11.36 
 
 
-0.665 
(0.259**) 
0.221 
(0.112**) 
1.655 
(0.13***) 
0.799 
(0.067***) 
-0.616 
(0.131***) 
-0.345 
(0.146***) 
0.567 
(0.053***) 
0.221 
(0.076**) 
-0.642 
(0.215**) 
-0.329 
(0.115**) 
0.95 
(0.418**) 
0.971 
(0.295***) 
 
-1356.48 
25.94 
[0.0021] 
 
20 
 
 
-0.205 
(0.144) 
0.106 
(0.048**) 
0.666 
(0.069***) 
-1.162 
(0.156***) 
-1.035 
(0.058***) 
-1.024 
(0.228***) 
0.362 
(0.028***) 
0.364 
(0.188**) 
-0.021 
(0.029) 
-0.508 
(0.14***) 
0.959 
(0.478**) 
0.979 
(0.458**) 
 
-857.5 
1.34 
[0.999] 
 
- 
Notes: The figures in parentheses are standard error of the estimators. * Significance of the coefficients at the 10% level. ** Idem 5% level.*** Idem 1% level. 
             The P-Values for Davies test are displayed as [.]. 
 
 
 
 4.3. Identifying the US subprime “contagion” to MENA stock markets: MS-EGARCH 
with varying transition probabilities 
 
As noted earlier, the use of the TVTP assesses the impact of the US subprime crisis on the 
MENA stock markets. Our purpose is to investigate whether the dynamic phases of MENA 
stock returns, which show a relative coincidence with the third phase of the subprime crisis, 
are affected by a fall in the US stock market returns (mean contagion) or/and a volatility 
increase in the US stock market returns (volatility contagion). To this purpose we test, as a 
first step, for significance of the time-varying probabilities to govern movements across 
regimes. In a second step, we investigate whether a decrease (increase) in the US returns (US 
returns volatility) will lead to decrease the probabilities of remaining in a no-crisis regime 
(bull market).  
 
Table 4. Estimations results with the TVPT 
 Oman Bahrain Kuwait Dubai Morocco Egypt Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p0 
 
q0 
 
p1 
 
q1 
 
 
 
 
 
LogLik  
LR 
 
Mean Contagion 
result 
 
 
 
-0.580 
(0.207**) 
0.119 
(0.035***) 
1.410 
(0.078***) 
-0.190 
(0.148) 
-1.260 
(0.065***) 
0.527 
(0.143***) 
-0.074 
(0.153) 
-0.251 
(0.223) 
-0.181 
(0.032***) 
-0.151 
(0.036***) 
 
 
2.577 
(0.387***) 
4.287 
(0.527***) 
-0.106 
(0.124) 
-1.384 
(0.606**) 
 
 
 
 
 
-860.526 
5,948 
 
 
no 
 
-0.326 
(0.112**) 
0.038 
(0.021*) 
0.393 
(0.075***) 
-1.017 
(0.15***) 
-0.446 
(0.065***) 
0.735 
(0.122***) 
0.509 
(0.145***) 
0.059 
(0.198) 
-0.189 
(0.036***) 
-0.195 
(0.041***) 
 
 
2.197 
(0.247***) 
3.032 
(0.217***) 
-0.225 
(0.084**) 
1.22 
(0.394***) 
 
 
 
 
 
-487.791 
10,958** 
 
 
yes 
 
-0.498 
(0.154***) 
0.186 
(0.086**) 
0.852 
(0.080***) 
-0.477 
(0.079***) 
-0.817 
(0.067***) 
0.360 
(0.058***) 
-0.115 
(0.141) 
-0.048 
(0.075) 
-0.184 
(0.033***) 
-0.111 
(0.033***) 
 
 
2.804 
(0.413***) 
3.598 
(0.367***) 
-0.035 
(0.132) 
0.389 
(0.272) 
 
 
 
 
 
-797.033 
1,374 
 
 
no 
 
-1.044 
(0.207***) 
0.054 
(0.055) 
1.648 
(0.088***) 
0.094 
(0.058*) 
-1.457 
(0.072***) 
-0.246 
(0.06***) 
0.007 
(0.105) 
-0.019 
(0.044) 
-0.186 
(0.03***) 
-0.053 
(0.043) 
 
 
2.128 
(0.253***) 
3.446 
(0.244***) 
-0.246 
(0.084**) 
0.058 
(0.134) 
 
 
 
 
 
-1051.95 
1,64 
 
 
no 
 
-0.345 
(0.185*) 
0.086 
(0.043**) 
0.236 
(0.15*) 
0.001 
(0.116) 
-0.819 
(0.091***) 
-0.251 
(0.145**) 
0.514 
(0.395) 
-0.283 
(0.099**) 
0.32 
(0.095***) 
0.191 
(0.213) 
 
 
3.783 
(0.627***) 
4.319 
(0.475***) 
-1.298 
(0.373***) 
0.436 
(0.151**) 
 
 
 
 
 
-838.624 
15,932*** 
 
 
yes 
 
-0.779 
(0.241***) 
0.233 
(0.057***) 
-2.473 
(2.891) 
-3.538 
(2.491*) 
-4.435 
(3.938) 
-2.735 
(3.251) 
0.552 
(0.6) 
0.584 
(0.293**) 
-1.02 
(0.917) 
0.188 
(0.217) 
 
 
2.311 
(0.336***) 
3.208 
(0.29***) 
-0.027 
(0.114) 
0.348 
(0.094***) 
 
 
 
 
 
-981.168 
8,584** 
 
 
yes 
 
-0.813 
(0.094***) 
0.227 
(0.114**) 
0.657 
(0.067***) 
-0.679 
(0.098***) 
-0.657 
(0.078***) 
-0.352 
(0.164***) 
0.618 
(0.063***) 
0.603 
(0.057***) 
-0.123 
(0.027***) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
 
 
2.902 
(0.29***) 
3.36 
(0.413***) 
-0.049 
(0.163) 
0.395 
(0.13***) 
 
 
 
 
 
-1352.83 
7,3** 
 
 
yes 
 
Note: The figures in parentheses are standard error of the estimators. 
* Significance of the coefficients at the 5% level. ** Idem 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5. Estimations results with the TVPT for the contagion volatility 
 Oman Bahrain Kuwait Dubai Morocco Egypt Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p0 
 
q0 
 
p1 
 
q1 
 
 
 
 
 
LogLik  
LR 
 
Volatility Contagion 
result 
 
 
 
-0.402 
(0.258*) 
0.128 
(0.033***) 
1.139 
(0.105***) 
-1.642 
(0.292***) 
-1.145 
(0.072***) 
-1.517 
(0.332***) 
0.457 
(0.317*) 
0.758 
(0.843) 
-0.225 
(0.033***) 
-0.189 
(0.042**) 
 
 
2.360 
(0.426***) 
3.674 
(0.426***) 
-0.251 
(0.052***) 
-0.157 
(0.056**) 
 
 
 
 
 
-854.014 
18.972*** 
 
 
yes 
 
-0.293 
(0.109**) 
0.037 
(0.022*) 
0.255 
(0.077***) 
-1.197 
(0.237***) 
-0.356 
(0.06***) 
0.791 
(0.136***) 
0.473 
(0.286*) 
-0.074 
(0.262) 
-0.197 
(0.038***) 
-0.198 
(0.07**) 
 
 
2.087 
(0.328***) 
3.209 
(0.206***) 
-0.278 
(0.048***) 
-0.688 
(0.287**) 
 
 
 
 
 
-488.825 
8.89** 
 
 
yes 
 
-0.488 
(0.146***) 
0.080 
(0.036**) 
0.869 
(0.064***) 
-0.497 
(0.112***) 
-0.819 
(0.056***) 
0.495 
(0.096***) 
0.047 
(0.163***) 
-0.31 
(0.156***) 
-0.179 
(0.033***) 
-0.107 
(0.033***) 
 
 
2.852 
(0.483***) 
3.806 
(0.427***) 
-0.203 
(0.057***) 
-0.305 
(0.141**) 
 
 
 
 
 
-796.851 
1.738 
 
 
no 
 
-0.179 
(0.259) 
-0.041 
(0.06) 
1.038 
(0.094***) 
-0.792 
(0.242***) 
-0.989 
(0.072***) 
-0.781 
(0.27**) 
0.693 
(0.495) 
0.39 
(0.35) 
-0.182 
(0.03***) 
0.1 
(0.064*) 
 
 
2.113 
(0.284***) 
2.895 
(0.329***) 
-0.275 
(0.041***) 
-0.122 
(0.044**) 
 
 
 
 
 
-1046.178 
13.184*** 
 
 
yes 
 
 
-0.248 
(0.157*) 
0.08 
(0.041**) 
0.695 
(0.092***) 
0.009 
(0.104) 
-1.671 
(0.075***) 
-0.236 
(0.06***) 
-0.344 
(0.075***) 
-0.356 
(0.087***) 
0.571 
(0.034***) 
-0.031 
(0.08) 
 
 
3.271 
(0.446***) 
4.26 
(0.451***) 
0.300 
(0.042***) 
0.341 
(0.055***) 
 
 
 
 
 
-840.606 
11.968*** 
 
 
no 
 
 
-0.717 
(0.136***) 
0.218 
(0.051***) 
1.692 
(0.167***) 
0.492 
(0.147***) 
-1.182  
(0.171***) 
-0.442 
(0.147***) 
-0.275 
(0.16*) 
-0.498 
(0.464) 
0.009 
(0.143) 
0.059 
(0.078) 
 
 
2.373 
(0.321***) 
3.329 
(0.313***) 
-0.348 
(0.104***) 
-0.157 
(0.04***) 
 
 
 
 
 
-975.102 
20.716*** 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
-0.852 
(0.145***) 
0.226 
(0.114**) 
0.512 
(0.071***) 
-0.855 
(0.188***) 
-0.606 
(0.081***) 
-0.573 
(0.348*) 
0.676 
(0.122***) 
0.605 
(0.081***) 
-0.124 
(0.027**) 
-0.036 
(0.022*) 
 
 
2.762 
(0.478***) 
3.469 
(0.616***) 
0.534 
(0.058***) 
0.114 
(0.063*) 
 
 
 
 
 
-1352.36 
8.24** 
 
 
no 
 
 
 
Empirical results of mean and volatility contagion are presented in table 4 and table 5 
respectively. For the first step, we use the likelihood ratio (LR) tests in order to compare the 
fixed transition probabilities model with two time-varying transition probabilities models. In 
the first model, the probability of a switch in regime is assumed to vary with US return. In 
addition, in the second model, the probability of a switch in regime is assumed to vary with 
US volatility. We test in these two cases for the null hypothesis according to which the 
transition probabilities are constant. As reported in Table 4, results support the rejection of the 
null hypothesis at a significant level of 5% for Bahrain, Morocco, Egypt and Turkey. In these 
cases, the LR statistic exceeds the (2) that is equal to 5.99 and 9.21 assuming a 5% and 1% 
level of confidence, respectively. Hence, we can assert that there is evidence of a statistically 
significant response of these countries stock markets to the US stock markets return variation. 
In addition, the results in Table 5 indicate that the LR statistic of Oman, Bahrain, Dubai, 
Egypt and Turkey exceeds the (2). These results prove that US volatility provides useful 
information in explaining the time variation in the transition probabilities. However, it turns 
out that the Kuwait stock market is not affected by the US stock market return variation and 
volatility. This immunity to shocks originated in the US does not exclude the possibility that 
 the Kuwait stock market could be affected by other regional shocks explaining switches 
between bull and bear markets. 
 
In addition, as with the fixed transitions probabilities, the results of selected countries in 
Table 4 and 5 are also consistent with the existence of two regimes since the intercept of 
model seems lower in the “low mean-high variance” regime than in the “high mean-low 
variance” regime and the intercept of the conditional variance is substantially higher in the 
bear market than in the bull market. 
In the countries for which we have revealed a strong presumption of “contagion” using LR 
test, we next analyze the marginal effect of the US stocks returns and US volatility on stock 
markets of these countries in order to confirm the existence of a mean contagion and/or 
volatility contagion. Table 4 and 5 present the coefficient estimates of  which 
enable us to identify the direction of the impact on the various MENA stock markets, 
according to the criteria discussed above.  
For countries where a significant impact of US returns is verified (Table 4), estimates   
have a plausible sign and is statistically significant.  is positive and equal to 1.22, 0.436, 
0.348 and 0.395 for Bahrain, Morocco, Egypt and Turkey, respectively. Given the positive 
sign, the fall in the US stock market return raises the probability of switching from high 
mean-low variance regime to the low mean- high variance regime in MENA stock markets. 
This result provides evidence that the shocks of US return have a negative effect on the 
probability of remaining in the no-crisis regime and send these MENA stock markets into 
bear market. We could interpret this result as the evidence of mean contagion from the US 
Subprime financial crisis to Bahrain, Morocco, Egypt and Turkey.   
Moreover, volatility contagion can be found for Oman, Bahrain, Dubai and Egypt stock 
markets (Table 5). With the exception of Turkey from countries where a significant impact of 
US volatility is verified, estimates  for all countries have a negative sign and are 
statistically significant. These findings provide evidence that an increase in the US stock 
market volatility raises the probability of switching from high mean-low variance regime to 
the low mean-high variance regime. That is, a negative reaction occurs in Oman, Bahrain, 
Dubai and Egypt stock markets due to the US stock market volatility shocks during the 
subprime financial crisis.  
Overall, our results suggest that the US stock market return is statistically important in the 
prediction of low-returns, high variance regime for most MENA stock markets during the 
subprime financial crisis. We find that there is mean and volatility contagion. Both types of 
contagion lead to an increased likelihood of occurrence of crisis in these countries. This result 
brings to light the effect of the subprime crisis on these MENA markets sentiments. 
According to Goldstein (1998), the subprime crises played a ‘wake-up call’ role for the 
MENA investors, essentially domestic investors whose changes in expectations are behind the 
switch from a good to a bad (crisis) equilibrium (Masson, 1999). By contrast, Kuwait stock 
market does not seem to be significantly influenced by the US stock market, which implies 
that this market is relatively immune to shocks originating from the US. However, evidence 
of bear market for Kuwait stock market could be generated by other regional or other 
international shocks during the global financial crisis, for example a fall in the oil price at the 
end of 2008. In addition, our test does not identify any switching of mean and volatility for 
the Jordan stock market during the subprime crisis.  
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
This paper is an attempt to investigate whether any of the developing stock markets of MENA 
region have been affected by the financial “contagion” of the 2007 US subprime crisis. To 
this end, we have extended the Cerra and Saxena (2002) methodology using a MS-EGARCH 
model with time-varying transition probabilities in order to test “contagion” from the US 
stock market (ground-zero country) to eight MENA stock markets. Our Markov switching 
analysis differs from earlier studies in two important ways. Firstly, our methodology analyses 
directly the individual stock market sentiment in contrast to a correlation approach which tests 
the structural change of links between markets. Furthermore, this paper is the first attempt to 
investigate the effect of the subprime crisis on the MENA stock markets sentiment. Secondly, 
the MS-EGARCH model is used for the first time in order to identify the contagion effect 
during the international financial crisis.   
Estimating our MS-EGARCH model with daily stock market assets returns data, ranging from 
February 20, 2007 to March 31, 2009, we have shown that our model clearly captures the 
persistent phase of a bear market in all the MENA stock markets of our sample with the 
exception of Jordan. This bear market phase which started in September 2008 coincides with 
the third phase of the current global financial crisis. Besides, we have found mean and 
volatility contagion in the Bahrain and Egypt stock markets. Our results highlight a significant 
increase in the likelihood of crisis occurrence characterized by low return and high volatility, 
following the US stock market fall and the US volatility rise. Our study also reveals a mean 
contagion to Morocco and Turkey, while the contagion to Oman and Dubai is explained only 
by the US volatility (volatility contagion). Our results are directly comparable to previous 
studies analysing contagion vulnerability of small emerging markets such as African and 
MENA markets. They are in line with the evidence of Collins and Biekpe (2002) and 
Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2009) concerning contagion vulnerability of Morocco, Egypt and 
Turkey. Nevertheless, our results do not confirm the vulnerability of the Jordan stock market 
during the global financial crisis. Moreover, we find out for the first time, the vulnerability of 
the GCC region to contagion of the global financial crisis. It should be noted, however, that 
our methodology focuses on changes in market sentiment during the subprime crisis, rather 
than occurrence of the stock market crash in the MENA region.  
The fact that very different countries have been contaminated, as shown in our study, tends to 
give credence to the global characteristic of the crisis. On the one hand, among affected 
market in our sample, there is for example Morocco, one of the smallest markets in the 
MENA region, with a market capitalization equal to $9.2 billion in 2009, and only 56 listed 
stocks (see table 3 in appendix 2). We have also larger stock markets (for example: Egypt and 
Turkey). If we consider the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio (table 4 in appendix 2), 
which is generally considered as an indicator of over (if greater that 100) or undervaluation (if 
smaller than 100), we have overvalued (Bahrain) as well as undervalued markets (Egypt, 
Oman). Thus, we can deduce from our research the important magnitude of the current 
financial crisis which is affecting a large variety of markets, regardless of their characteristics 
(size of the market, liquidity, stage of liberalization, level of international financial integration 
and so on). On the other hand, our sample also includes GCC and non GCC countries. This 
implies that the current financial crisis is not related to the type of specialization of the 
countries under consideration (oil exporting countries or more diversified economies). These 
findings might suggest that international portfolio diversification in segmented MENA equity 
markets has not really been an efficient instrument of immunization against the risk of 
contagion.  
Moreover, after they had devoted significant efforts in order to strengthen financial 
intermediation by promoting market-based mechanisms, modernizing banking practices, 
adopting international standards of supervision, as well as building the infrastructure of 
 dynamic equity markets (Egypt, Morocco and Gulf Cooperation Council countries), the fact 
that some MENA countries are clearly victims of a “contagion” can legitimize the choice to 
stop or even to reverse the process of economic and financial liberalization, so as to reduce 
reliance on international capital investment and on trade relations (foreign outlets and 
supplying) and to base development on domestic resources and activities. Today, some 
experts are singing the praises of disconnection and celebrating the emergence of a new 
refocused, inward-looking mode of development. 
In order to support such a policy, it would be necessary to establish a causal relationship 
between international commercial and financial integration and “contagion”. It would be 
necessary to prove that the developing and emerging counties which have been spared the 
devastating effects of financial turmoil and contagion, because of their lack of integration into 
the international financial system and the low level of capital inflows. In fact, this proof 
remains to be shown. In one sense, our study tends to suggest the opposite, without 
establishing any reliable proof, due to the small number of countries in our sample. No doubt 
that a complete and undifferentiated withdrawal into oneself might be a good recipe for low 
growth, high unemployment, and losing opportunities to benefit from the global evolution. 
Nevertheless, strategies of insulation in order to protect the economy from the negative 
externalities of financial liberalisation can be considered as a possible and, in some cases, as a 
desirable solution, providing that it does not push the country to the sidelines of international 
competition. The experience of Chile which succeeded in protecting itself from contagion 
during the 90’s by imposing a tax on short-term inflows of foreign capital has been 
thoroughly studied (see for example Ito and Portes, 1998; Eichengreen, 1999; and Edwards, 
1999, among others). 
To preserve their economies from the excesses of globalization, MENA countries should 
rather further strengthen their domestic financial systems by enhancing prudential regulations 
and supervision. They should continue their efforts and progress in deepening capital markets 
so as to improve liquidity and in diversifying sources of financing. 
No need to throw the baby out with the bathwater. 
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 Appendix 1 
Figure1: Daily price, returns and volatility of the MENA stock markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure2: Smoothed probabilities of regime 0 (crisis regime). 
    
 
 
   
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1. Comparative indicators for MENA stock markets and other emerging markets (2007) 
Country Listed stocksa Liquidity (%)b  
 
MENA markets 
Oman 
Bahrain 
Kuwait 
Dubai 
Morocco 
Egypt 
Turkey 
Jordan 
 
Emerging 
Markets 
Argentina 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Korea 
Singapore 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
125 
51 
196 
55 
73 
435 
319 
245 
 
 
 
111 
367 
404 
1757 
762 
244 
523 
986 
 
 
22.6 
4 
100 
74.8 
29.8 
47.3 
129.7 
42.3 
 
 
 
8.87 
29.8 
57.08 
192.61 
77.6 
33.02 
66.6 
57.07 
Source: Smimou and Karabegovic (2010) for MENA markets. Lagoard-Segot and Lucey (2009) for 
Emerging markets. 
a ‘Listed companies’ are the number of listed companies at the end of the year. 
b ‘Liquidity’ corresponds to total value traded for the year divided by market capitalization. 
 
Table 2: Average Daily Market Value Traded (US$ bn) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Change(a) 
Saudi Arabia 4.415 5.611 2.728 2.094 1.300 -37.9% 
Kuwait 0.402 0.244 0.558 0.534       0.150 -71.9% 
Qatar 0.113 0.082 0.120 0.193 0.100 -48.1% 
Oman 0.014 0.009 0.021 0.035 0.006 -82.8% 
UAE (DFM & ADX) 0.572 0.489 0.614 0.595 0.120 -79.8% 
Bahrain 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.001 -88.1% 
Jordan 0.090 0.700 0.600 0.100 0.040 -60.0% 
Egypt 0.820 0.164 0.199 0.293 0.110 -62.5% 
Source: Bloomberg, Zawya & Dubai Abu Dhabi UAE Stocks and Shares Discussion Forum 
(a) Change from December 2008 to January 19, 2009 
 
  
Table 3: Market Capitalization - Major MENA Markets (US$ bn) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Change (a) 
Saudi Arabia 646 327 519 247 239 -3.1% 
Kuwait 142 144 211 121 99 -18.7% 
Qatar 87 61 93 77 61 -21.1% 
Oman 13 13 23 15 14 -8.7% 
UAE (DFM & ADX) 231 169 257 132 127 63.8% 
Bahrain 17 21 27 20 19 -5% 
Jordan 37 29 41 35 34 -1.9% 
Egypt 81 95 137 57 57 0.7% 
Source: Bloomberg, Zawya & Global Research & Dubai Abu Dhabi UAE Stocks and Shares Discussion Forum 
(a) Change from December 2008 to January 19, 2009 
Table 4. Market capitalization to GDP ratio (a) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 
Bahrain 
Egypt 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Morocco 
Oman 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
133 
87 
200 
37 
75 
45 
14 
31 
- 
107 
249 
44 
101 
- 
15 
44 
- 
53 
179 
34 
76 
- 
16 
15 
Source: Data extracted from the World Bank data base 
(a) Market capitalization/GDP’ is the market capitalization at the end of each year divided by GDP for the year 
 
 
 
 
 
